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Abstract 
This article analyzes the effect of religious affiliation on fertility in Japan, Korea and 
the Republic of China (Taiwan). It adds to the sparse empirical evidence on the 
effects of religious affiliation on fertility in East Asia, for both Abrahamic and other 
religions. It uses an identity-economic model and analyzes prescriptions among 
the different religions to derive testable hypotheses about the effect of religions on 
fertility. In the empirical section, the East Asian Social Survey (EASS) and a 
generalized Poisson model are used to estimate the effects of different religions 
on fertility. In line with theoretical predictions, the empirical results suggest that the 
positive effect of Catholicism on fertility that has disappeared in both Europe and 
the US in past decades is still present in East Asia. In line with the sparse previous 
empirical evidence on Buddhism, it seems to have no effect on fertility. 
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1.  Introduction  
There is quite a substantial amount of research on the fertility effects of 
different religions, analysing the effects of Judaism and different Christian 
denominations, and using data from the US and Europe. Usually, these studies 
find that there used to be a pronounced difference between Catholics and 
Protestants in the past, with the former having had much higher fertility rates, but 
that this difference has all but disappeared. At the same time, these studies also 
usually find that fertility rates among Jewish Americans are much lower. See, for 
example, Lehrer (1996) for an overview. Different norms among the religions are 
often cited as the explanation for these differences in behaviour (e.g., the anti-
contraception stance of the Vatican as the reason for higher fertility among 
Catholics in the past).  
Much less is known about the possible fertility effects of other religions, and 
of the fertility effects of the Christian religions in other regions. The aim of my 
article is to close part of this research gap by adding to the sparse previous 
literature. Firstly, it analyses the possible fertility effects of Christian religions in 
East Asian countries and compares their effects to those reported in the previous 
literature on fertility effects of Christian religions in Western countries. Secondly, it 
analyses the possible effects of other religions, especially Buddhism, on fertility 
behaviour in East Asian countries, and compares the results to those reported in 
the previous literature. Finally, it also analyses the effect of having a traditional 
attitude on fertility.  
For the empirical analysis, I use the 2006 wave of the East Asian Social 
Study (EASS) and data for Japan, Korea, and the Republic of China (Taiwan), 
countries well known for their ultra-low fertility rates (Jones et al. 2009). Because 
of the one-child policy and related population control policies and lack of freedom 
of religion in the PR China, I did not use the data on China. Fertility is measured 
as the number of children born to married women in their first marriage, with two 
additional robustness checks. The first one limits this sample to women above age 
45 who should have completed their fertility decisions, and the second one uses 
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the respondent’s ideal number of children as a dependent variable to take into 
account possible differences between intended and actual fertility. Estimation 
results suggest that being Catholic is associated with higher fertility in these three 
countries, while there are no effects for being Buddhist or Protestant, and no 
effects of having a traditional attitude either. Being a follower of other Christian 
religions is associated with significantly lower fertility. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a 
brief review of the relevant literature. In Section 3, I give a brief discussion of 
theoretical considerations, and in section 4, I describe the data set used for the 
empirical analysis. Section 5 presents and discusses estimation results, while 
Section 6 concludes.  
2.  Literature review 
East Asia’s ultra-low fertility rates are a well-known empirical fact and have 
been the focus of much research on causes and on policies to increase fertility 
(see, for example, Jones et al. 2009 or Suzuki 2013). Some of the reasons 
discussed in the literature include the trend to marry later or to remain single 
(Jones and Gubhaju 2009), the high costs of education per child which prevent 
couples from having more than one or two children (Anderson and Kohler 2013 for 
the case of Korea), or institutional features of married life which become less and 
less attractive compared to living as a single with one’s parents, especially for 
women (Bumpass et al. 2009 for the case of Japan). Those well-documented low 
fertility rates and their underlying causes should be seen as the background for the 
following discussion of previous relevant literature on the effect of religion on 
fertility. I restrict the following literature review to the few studies which also focus 
on non-Christian religions and/or on non-Western countries, but exclude studies 
dealing with Muslim-Hindu differences, as there are neither Muslims nor Hindus in 
the dataset for the three countries under consideration.1 For an overview of results 
                                                 
1 In addition to religious affiliation, other studies also analyze the effect of religiosity, measured 
as the frequency of religious attendance or praying, on fertility. As there is no information on 
religiosity in the EASS, I will not discuss previous research on religiosity here. 
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for the United States, see Lehrer (2004) and Zhang (2008), and for a comparison 
of results from Europe and the United States, see Frejka and Westoff (2008). 
McQuillan (2004) provides a useful starting point for understanding the 
conditions under which religion affects fertility using case studies. He shows that 
religion matters for fertility when the religion actually has norms that guide fertility 
behaviour, when the religion is able to enforce these norms and to communicate 
them to members, and when members’ religious affiliation matters greatly in their 
daily lives. When these three conditions are not met, it is unlikely that religious 
affiliation matters for fertility. This article can help to explain why results for the 
effects of religion on fertility vary widely for different countries and different 
religions, as the following results show. 
In the following paragraph, I summarize results from previous studies that 
focus on the effect of Buddhism before turning to the effects of the Abrahamic 
religions in non-Western countries. For the effects of Buddhism on fertility, Knodel 
et al. (1999) analyse differences between Buddhist and Muslim fertility in Thailand 
and find that Buddhists have experienced a more significant fertility transition than 
Muslims, i.e. they have lower fertility rates. De la Croix and Delavallade (2014) use 
micro-level data from South East Asia (Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) and find that being Buddhist increases fertility 
compared to being religiously unaffiliated. Kojima (2014), however, uses data from 
the “Survey on Comparative Study of Family Policies in East Asia: South Korea, 
Singapore and Japan” and finds widely different results for the effects of Buddhism 
on the number of children, using separate samples for men and women aged 20 to 
49 in the three countries. Buddhism has no effect on fertility in Japan and in 
Singapore, but is found to increase the probability of at least having 3 children for 
Korean men, compared to having 2 children. Skirbekk et al. (2015) analyse the 
effect of Buddhism on fertility in Cambodia, India, Japan, Mongolia, Nepal, and 
Thailand. Controlling for a host of background variables, they find that Buddhism is 
not related to or significantly decreases fertility, except in Cambodia. Interestingly 
enough, the percentages of Buddhists among the population vary widely in the 
4 
 
countries that they analyse, suggesting that the effect does not depend on minority 
o majority status of the religion. The summarized scarce empirical evidence for the 
possible effects of Buddhism on fertility shows widely different results for different 
countries and samples.  
For the Abrahamic religions in non-Western countries, de la Croix and 
Delavallade (2014) find that being Catholic, Muslim or Protestant increases fertility 
compared to being religiously unaffiliated, but that there is no such effect for 
Hinduism. Kojima (2014) finds that for Catholicism and Protestantism, there are no 
effects on fertility in Korea and Singapore. Singaporean Muslims, however, are 
found to have significantly more children. Heaton (2011) uses data from 30 
developing countries and compares Catholic, Muslim and Protestant fertility 
behaviour. He finds substantial differences between Muslim and Christian fertility 
rates in many countries, with Muslims having higher fertility, but only small 
differences between Catholics and Protestants and concludes that those 
differences vary widely between the countries included in his sample, leaving large 
parts of the variation unexplained by his regression models. Those results point to 
a positive fertility effect of being Muslim, compared to the religiously unaffiliated, 
while the results for the Christian religions are less clear-cut.  
Again, the theoretical model by McQuillan (2004) might explain the mixed 
previous evidence for the effects of religion on fertility in the existing literature. 
While all of the analysed religions have prescriptions on fertility, their capability of 
communicating them to members and enforcing them, as well as individual 
importance, might differ. Varying degrees of enforcement (capability) from 
religious institutions and individual differences in the importance of religion in 
general or their fertility-related prescriptions in the studies cited above might be 
able to explain the mixed evidence for the effects of religions on fertility. 
While this article cannot control for all of these factors either, it has at least 
two advantages over previous research. Firstly, it uses a sample of three countries 
that, despite important differences, share the cultural influence of Confucianism, 
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and where its principles are still present in everyday life (Chang 1997, Tu 1996), 
so the possible confounding effects of other cultural influences should be smaller. 
Secondly, it uses additional information on an individual’s traditional attitudes that 
might matter for fertility decisions as well, but have not been analyzed in the 
previous literature.  
As this section has shown, there are no established conclusions for the 
impact of religion on fertility yet, and the amount of research dedicated to non-
Abrahamic religions, such as Buddhism, is relatively small, indicating the need for 
more research on the topic. In the next section, I will outline a theoretical 
framework and analyse the different religions’ prescriptions with respect to fertility 
to derive testable hypotheses for the empirical analysis. 
3.  Theoretical considerations 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) introduced the concept of identity into economic 
theory, and show how identity, or an individual's sense of self, matters for 
economic outcomes. The model assumes that identity depends on an individual's 
assigned social category, such as religion, how the individual's characteristics 
match that category's ideals, and how the individual's and other society members' 
actions correspond to the set of behaviours for the assigned category. 
Following their terminology, I assume that there are two different social 
categories Ci: believers (type A), and non-believers (type B). Correspondingly, 
there are different prescriptions or sets of behaviours Pi considered to be 
appropriate for members of the categories, with our behaviour of interest being the 
decision to have children. Let Pa denote the prescriptions for the believers, and Pb 
the prescriptions for the non-believers. These prescriptions are of course different 
for believers of different religions and might or might not include the prescription to 
have (many) children. Assume further that for some type A individuals, 
expectations towards others include to comply with the social norm to have 
children, while type B individuals do not have this expectation. 
Akerlof and Kranton incorporate identity into the following utility function: 
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Uj = Uj(aj, a-j, Ij) 
In this utility function, aj denotes the vector of one's own actions, a-j denotes 
the vector of other society members' actions, and Ij denotes an individual's identity. 
Our action aj of interest is the decision to have children. 
For the sake of simplicity, assume that having children increases utility 
through two channels: a children-derived utility component and an identity-derived 
utility component. The children-derived utility component contains the ‘joy of 
parenting’ that might increase individual utility. Let aj denote this utility component. 
The identity-derived component affects utility through approval or disapproval from 
individuals of the same social category (a-j), but also through Ij if an individual acts 
in accordance with his or her identity. 
In addition, an individual’s identity Ij might also affect utility. Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000) specify identity as follows: 
Ij = Ij(aj, a-j,cj, εj, P)  
Here, cj denotes the vector of the individual’s assigned social categories, P 
denotes prescriptions, and εj denotes the individual’s own characteristics. In the 
case of religion, individuals might choose cj, which could refer to a religion, but 
also to a certain school of thought within a religion, or the intensity of their religious 
participation. For the prescriptions P, again, there might be differences in the way 
believers interpret the prescriptions of their faith, or how they interact with an 
individual’s own characteristics εj, or how intensely those prescriptions are 
communicated and enforced within a religious community. This might depend on 
characteristics and structure of the community, their religious leaders, and a host 
of other determinants. It might also depend on the majority/minority status of a 
religion, with implications for fertility behaviour again depending on a host of other 
factors. McQuillan (2004) provides several case studies of the impact of both 
Catholicism and Islam on fertility that can explain some of the widely differing 
results in previous research.  
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While an analysis of individuals’ identity and the role it plays for their fertility 
decisions would be highly interesting, it would also require a wealth of individual-
level and community-level data that is, unfortunately, not available in the EASS, 
and probably interviews would be a better suited research method. In this research, 
I therefore assume a representative believer who maximizes utility Uj and have to 
abstract from possible determinants related to identity discussed in this paragraph.  
All individuals choose whether to have children or not. As the prescription to 
do so, or to have many children, should on average be much stronger among 
believers of certain religions, those should have stronger incentives to have 
children, compared to non-believers. Non-believers' social norms do not include 
the prescription to have many children, so they should have less incentives to 
have children.  
Information on respondents’ religion in the EASS is contained in the 
following categories: Buddhist, Catholic, Protestant, Other Christian, Other Eastern, 
and Other Religions. Unfortunately, the EASS does not include more detailed 
information about different Protestant denominations, other Christian and other 
Eastern religions. However, those categories include a host of different 
denominations (in the case of Protestantism) and religions. Similarly, East Asian 
Buddhism is characterized by a number of different schools, and Buddhists often 
simultaneously practice other religions, such as Shamanism, Shintoism or Taoism. 
These limitations should be kept in mind. The following paragraphs gives a brief 
overview of religions’ prescriptions with respect to fertility for the religions that are 
contained in the EASS, as well as for traditional values, and discuss which 
believers actually might have prescriptions to have (many) children. 
Buddhism is characterized by a number of different schools of thought 
(Barnhart 2009) which results in a limited number of sources that can be used to 
derive the faith’s prescriptions on matters related to fertility. While there are 
important differences between the three branches of Buddhism that emerged 
during the faith’s expansion from India throughout Asia, there are also basic 
elements that are shared by all its branches and schools of thought (Barnhart 
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2009). As Barnhart (2009) suggests, the Sigalavada Sutra (‘Discourse to Sigala’) 
contains what could be seen ‘a set of possible Buddhist “family values”’. According 
to his analysis of the Sigalavada Sutra, there is a strong focus on reciprocity in 
relationships within the family, but nothing that suggests it is a couple’s duty to 
have children in the first place, or to avoid action that would prevent conception or 
birth. However, there are also other opinions. Keown (1995) argues that traditional 
Buddhism condemns abortion, citing the importance of the first of the Five 
Precepts in Buddhism that forbids killing. This point of view, however, contrasts 
with Buddhist practice in Japan. As Barnhart (2009) discusses, infanticide (mabiki) 
during famines was almost never condemned by Buddhist authorities, and rituals 
developed for parents to apologize for abortions, using the notion of ‘water child’ 
(mizuku kuyo), an idea that at conception, the embryo lacks conscience and needs 
time to fully develop into life, opening up the possibility that this life “is reversible 
without prejudice to the possibility of reforming and re-emerging at a later time” 
(Barnhart 2009). As the previous paragraph has shown, despite the diversity of 
Buddhist tradition and schools of thought, the lack of any pro-natalist prescriptions 
means that one would expect no differences between Buddhists and the 
religiously unattached with respect to fertility. 
The Catholic Church probably has the most clearly pronounced 
prescriptions on fertility among all the religions analysed in this article. However, 
there often seem to be misconceptions about the religion’s teachings related to 
fertility. While it is true that the Catholic Church sees children as the “supreme gift 
of marriage” (Catechism 2002), firmly opposes abortion and any contraception 
method besides natural family planning, including the Billings method, it also 
teaches that the number of a children that a married couple have is solely their 
own decision, spouses can space the birth of their children (Richards 2009) and 
there is no duty or prescription to have many children whatsoever. Therefore, one 
might expect a positive effect of being Catholic on fertility, but this positive effect 
should not be too big. 
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Protestantism as the second Christian religion is characterized by less 
unified prescriptions, as there are a large number of different denominations within 
the faith. A broad distinction could be made between ecumenical and exclusivist 
Protestants, following Kelley (1972). The Anglican Church stated in its 1958 
Lambeth conference that “parents had the God-given moral responsibility for 
deciding upon the number and frequency of children” (Creighton 2009), as well as 
the possible choice of contraception methods. The Church of England accepts 
abortion as “sometimes justifiable and necessary, but fraught with moral ambiguity” 
(Creighton 2009). At a similar time, in 1959, the United Presbyterian Church of the 
United States approved voluntary family planning and responsible parenthood, 
sanctioning the use of contraception (Thomas 2012). The Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in America states that the use of effective contraceptives is expected when 
a couple does not intend to provide for a child that might be conceived 
(Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 2002), and the United Methodist Church 
also states that couples are “free to use those means of birth control considered 
medically safe” (The Book of Resolutions of The United Methodist Church 2012). 
Other Protestant denominations, including Pentecostal and other exclusivist 
groups, are less unified in their views on contraception, with many of them leaving 
it “up to the consciences of individual members of their congregations to decide for 
themselves” (Thomas 2012) or firmly opposing contraception and abortion (Lehrer 
1996). Therefore, one might not expect any differences between Protestants as a 
whole and the religiously unattached with respect to fertility. 
While there is a huge diversity, there are also some common traits of 
Chinese traditional belief systems (such as the “Other Eastern religions” in the 
EASS) with respect to livelihood and fertility, based on Confucianism, Daoism, and 
Buddhism. In Chinese folk belief systems, sons are strongly preferred to daughters 
because sons continue the family line, can perform ancestor worship and are 
traditionally the ones who are responsible for taking care of their parents (Lee et al. 
2009). An ideal family should have many children, even though daughters are 
traditionally seen only as temporary family members because they will become 
members of their husband’s family upon marriage (Lee et al. 2009). One might 
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therefore expect a positive effect of following “Other Eastern religions” on fertility, 
and especially a strong preference for sons. 
Despite important differences between the East Asian countries, their 
traditional values are all deeply influenced by Confucian thought (Chang 1997), 
and Confucian principles are still present in everyday life (Tu 1996). The cultures 
of East Asia place a special emphasis on the family (Lee 1989), with resulting 
strong prescriptions to marry and continue the family line by having sons. This 
emphasis is an implication of filial piety, one of the five human relations in 
Confucian thought. According to Mencius, the most important Confucian 
philosopher after Confucius himself, it is the worst crime against filial piety to not 
leave any posterity (Tang 1995). Similarly to the traditional Chinese belief systems, 
one might therefore expect a strong preference for sons, however, not necessarily 
an effect on overall fertility rates. One could, however, expect an effect on overall 
fertility rates if parents keep on trying for a son after having girl(s) and cannot or do 
not want to rely on sex-selective abortion. In the empirical analysis, I briefly 
discuss estimation results including the sex of children as a possible determinant 
of fertility.   
The following table summarizes the expected relationship between religious 
affiliation and fertility for the religions contained in the EASS. For “Other Christian 
religions” and “Other Religions”, it is impossible to derive hypotheses about their 
effects because of the diversity of religions that those groups contain. 
Table 1: Predicted effects of religions 
Religion Buddhism Catholicism Protestantism Other 
Eastern 
Traditional 
Values 
Effect on 
Fertility 
None Positive None Positive None 
4. Data set 
In the next section, I provide a short introduction of the data set that I use 
for the empirical analysis, as well as some descriptive statistics. Complete 
summary statistics are provided in Appendix 2. 
11 
 
For the empirical analysis, I use the 2006 East Asian Social Survey (EASS). 
Participating countries include the People's Republic of China, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Because of the one-child 
policy, related population control policies and lack of freedom of religion in the PR 
China, I could use only the observations from the latter three countries. After 
dropping observations with missing values and limiting the sample to women in 
their first marriage, a standard approach in the literature, the data set consists of n 
= 1,872 observations. 
The EASS contains information on respondents’ religion in the following 
categories: Buddhist, Catholic, Protestant, Other Christian, Other Eastern, and 
Other Religions. Unfortunately, the EASS does not include more detailed 
information about different Protestant denominations and other Eastern religions. 
Both categories include a host of different denominations (in the case of 
Protestantism) and religions, which might bias the results. Similarly, East Asian 
Buddhism is characterized by a number of different schools, and Buddhists often 
simultaneously practice other religions, such as Shamanism, Shintoism or Taoism. 
Finally, the EASS does not contain information on religious upbringing, but just on 
current religious affiliation. As religion can be seen as a choice and there might be 
the possibility that, for example, individuals self-select themselves into religions, 
the effects reported here might not necessarily reflect a causal relationship 
between religion and the number of children. These limitations of the data set 
should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. In order to capture the 
possible effects of religion on the number of children born to a woman, I included a 
set of dummy variables that take the value of 1 if a respondent belongs to a certain 
religion. 
The EASS also contains eighteen questions on individuals' attitudes 
towards marriage in general (e.g. "It is all right for a couple to live together without 
intending to get married", gender roles (e.g., "A husband's job is to earn money, a 
wife's job is to look after the home and family"), relationships inside the family (e.g., 
"The authority of father in a family should be respected under any circumstances"), 
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and filial piety (e.g., "Children must make efforts to do something that would bring 
honour to their parents") on a scale from 1 to 7 ("strongly disagree" to "strongly 
agree"). All questions can be found in Appendix 1. Using these questions, I 
construct an index to determine which individuals are traditionalist and which are 
non-traditionalist. Respondents are considered to be traditionalist if they answered 
with the most extreme category to more than two of the statements, which is the 
case for approximately 31% of the total sample.2  
In the next paragraphs, I discuss some descriptive features of the data set. 
The first table shows religious affiliation in the entire sample and for the three 
different countries.  
Table 2: Religious affiliation and very traditional attitudes 
  Entire Sample Japan Korea Taiwan 
No religion 40.59% 66.3% 32.44% 17.28% 
Catholic 3.66% 0.28% 11.05% 0.83% 
Protestant 9.13% 0.14% 25.67% 3.99% 
Buddhism 26.71% 25.7% 29.77% 25.08% 
Other Christian religions 0.42% 1.1%     
Other Eastern religions 19.18% 6.49%   52.33% 
Other religions 0.48%   1.07% 0.5% 
Very traditional  30.84% 8.15% 46.88% 43.19% 
n  1872  716 560  596  
 
Japan has by far the highest percentage of religiously unattached 
respondents with a percentage of 66.30%, followed by Korea with 32.44% and 
Taiwan with 17.28%. Korea has the highest share of Buddhist respondents with 
29.77%, followed by Japan with 25.7%, and Taiwan with 25.08%. Korea also has 
the highest share of Christian respondents (including both Roman Catholics and 
Protestants) with more than 36%, while the shares in all other participating 
countries are considerably lower. Taiwan’s percentage of Christian respondents 
(consisting of Roman Catholic and Protestant respondents) is 4.82%, and Japan’s 
                                                 
2 Results do not change if I use the index values instead of this dummy, but as interpretation 
is more intuitive for the dummy variable, I decided to use the dummy. 
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(consisting of Roman Catholics, Protestants and other Christian religions) is lowest 
with 1.52%. Finally, Taiwan has the highest share of respondents affiliated with 
other Eastern religions (52.33%), followed by Japan with 6.49%. There are also 
small groups of followers of other religions in Korea (1.07%) and Taiwan (0.5%), 
but not in Japan. The percentage of those with traditional attitudes is highest in 
Korea with 46.88%, followed by Taiwan with 43.19% and Japan with only 8.15%. 
The next table shows descriptive statistics on the relationship between 
religious affiliation and number of children. The sample, again, is restricted to 
women in their first marriage. 
Table 3: Religious affiliation and number of children  
  No religion Catholic Protestant Buddhist
Other 
Christian 
Other 
Eastern
Other 
religion 
Entire 
sample 2.00 2.36 2.06 2.36 1.25 2.63 2.63 
Japan 2.00 2.50 2.00 2.10 1.25 2.40   
Korea 1.96 2.32 1.99 2.35     1.67 
Taiwan 2.06 2.80 2.50 2.70   2.66 2.67 
 
The average number of children per woman in this sample is 2, with the 
lowest rate in Korea and the highest rate in Taiwan. One-way ANOVA was 
conducted to determine if there are differences in fertility between religions in the 
three countries. For Japan, Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances could not 
reject the null hypothesis of equal variances across groups (F(5, 718)= 0.6449, p= 
0.6655), and there was a statistically significant difference between religions as 
determined by one-way ANOVA (F(5, 718)= 3.34, p= 0.0054). For Korea, Levene’s 
test for homogeneity of variances could not reject the null hypothesis of equal 
variances across groups (F(4, 556)= 0.7208, p= 0.5780) and there was a 
statistically significant difference between religions as determined by one-way 
ANOVA (F(4, 556)= 4.25, p= 0.0021). For Taiwan, Levene’s test for homogeneity 
of variances could not reject the null hypothesis of equal variances across groups 
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(F(5, 596)= 0.8947, p= 0.4842), and there was a statistically significant difference 
between religions as determined by one-way ANOVA (F(5, 596)= 3.79, p= 0.0022). 
It should be kept in mind, however, that some of the categories contain only 
few observations and it remains to be tested if differences also persist in 
regressions that control for more possible impact factors on fertility. The following 
section presents those estimation results.  
5.  Estimation strategy and results  
As the number of children born to a woman is a nonnegative integer, count 
data methods are a natural choice for regression analysis. An often-used starting 
point for analysis is a Poisson model, but it requires the assumption of 
equidispersion, or equal mean and variance. If the equidispersion assumption is 
not satisfied, the estimated coefficients are still consistent, but estimated standard 
errors are biased, with overdispersion leading to downward biased standard errors, 
and underdispersion leading to upward biased standard errors (Winkelmann and 
Zimmermann 1994). A regression-based test for equidispersion following Cameron 
and Trivedi (2005) suggests that in all estimated models, the data are actually 
underdispersed, which is often the case for this type of data, i.e. fertility data for 
married women (Winkelmann and Zimmermann 1994). Estimated regression 
coefficients and standard errors from the test are reported at the bottom of table 4.  
For underdispersed count data, Harris et al. (2012) suggest the use of a 
generalized Poisson regression model that has also been used previously for the 
analysis of fertility by Wang and Famoye (1997). Harris et al.’s (2012) simulation 
study suggests that this model outperforms both Poisson and quasi-Poisson 
models with underdispersed data, so I chose the generalized Poisson model for 
the following empirical analysis. 
In line with previous research, I included the following control variables in 
the estimations: age, age at marriage, own and spouse’s education (in years), 
number of siblings, if it is the spouse’s first marriage, place of residence 
(countryside or big city, with those in medium-sized cities as the reference 
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category), and family income. In order to control for the respondent's general 
financial situation, I included a set of 9 dummy variables that take the value of 1 if 
the respondent belongs to the second up to the tenth decile of the respective 
country's income distribution respectively, with the first (lowest) income decile 
being the reference category.   
As the data set consists of respondents in three different countries, I include 
a control variable for their country of residence. The reference category is Japan, 
and I included two dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the respondent lives 
in Korea or in Taiwan, respectively. 
The following table reports regression results from generalized Poisson 
regressions. All estimations were carried out using Stata 13.1 and the user-written 
module gpoisson (Harris et al. 2012). 
Table 4: Generalized Poisson regression results 
Number of 
children 
Number of 
children 
Number of 
children 
Number of 
children 
Completed 
Fertility 
Ideal 
Number 
  Entire sample Korea Japan Taiwan Entire sample Entire sample 
Catholic 0.138*** 0.0712 0.159 0.0474 0.172** 0.0826** 
(0.0504) (0.0498) (0.270) (0.162) (0.0684) (0.0347) 
Protestant 0.0175 -0.0106 -0.177 0.0593 0.00719 0.0119 
(0.0390) (0.0414) (0.475) (0.0881) (0.0557) (0.0244) 
Buddhist 0.0161 0.0355 -0.00273 0.0184 0.0284 0.0147 
(0.0235) (0.0382) (0.0335) (0.0486) (0.0303) (0.0165) 
Other Christian -0.555*** -0.463*** -0.523** -0.332*** 
(0.178) (0.170) (0.206) (0.102) 
Other Eastern 0.0163 0.135** -0.00834 0.0452 0.0328 
(0.0288) (0.0556) (0.0439) (0.0374) (0.0207) 
Other religion -0.213 -0.211 -0.155 -0.244 0.0267 
(0.148) (0.160) (0.215) (0.208) (0.1000) 
Very traditional attitudes 0.0167 0.0573* -0.0513 -0.0192 0.0447 0.0145 
  (0.0217) (0.0310) (0.0490) (0.0301) (0.0292) (0.0146) 
Respondent's age 0.00889*** 0.0181*** 0.00438*** 0.0131*** 0.00983*** 0.00296*** 
(0.000934) (0.00192) (0.00134) (0.00168) (0.00148) (0.000719) 
Respondent's age at marriage -0.0386*** -0.0370*** -0.0248*** -0.0465*** -0.0319*** -0.00256 
(0.00282) (0.00532) (0.00453) (0.00456) (0.00382) (0.00205) 
Respondent's years of schooling -0.0223*** -0.00731 -0.000449 -0.0101* -0.0223*** -0.000769 
(0.00401) (0.00757) (0.0109) (0.00543) (0.00479) (0.00296) 
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Spouse's years of schooling -0.00143 0.00970 -0.0115 -0.0103** -0.00130 -0.00911*** 
(0.00355) (0.00596) (0.00724) (0.00514) (0.00429) (0.00263) 
Respondent's number of siblings 0.0120** 0.00997 -0.00666 0.0216*** -0.000159 0.00213 
(0.00474) (0.00883) (0.00920) (0.00681) (0.00572) (0.00354) 
Spouse's first marriage -0.0647 -0.0787 -0.0953 -0.191*** -0.0478 0.0620* 
(0.0496) (0.112) (0.0639) (0.0726) (0.0615) (0.0363) 
Lives in big city -0.0569*** -0.0760** -0.0816** -0.0364 -0.0388 -0.0107 
(0.0206) (0.0300) (0.0374) (0.0324) (0.0273) (0.0133) 
Lives in countryside 0.0168 0.0793 -0.0102 0.139** -0.00250 0.00288 
(0.0374) (0.163) (0.0469) (0.0598) (0.0451) (0.0259) 
Lives in Korea 0.0576* 0.135*** 0.0196 
(0.0317) (0.0452) (0.0214) 
Lives in Taiwan 0.100*** 0.166*** -0.0894*** 
(0.0313) (0.0426) (0.0206) 
In second decile  0.148*** 0.206*** 0.0394 0.152*** -0.0521* 
of income distribution (0.0362) (0.0569) (0.0530) (0.0429) (0.0280) 
In third decile -0.00818 -0.00611 -0.0679 0.0617 -0.130*** -0.0169 
of income distribution (0.0329) (0.0618) (0.0515) (0.0598) (0.0444) (0.0240) 
In fourth decile  0.0439 -0.0599 0.0142 0.0894 -0.0162 -0.0682*** 
of income distribution (0.0325) (0.0669) (0.0508) (0.0561) (0.0461) (0.0217) 
In fifth decile  0.0115 0.00547 0.0432 -0.00883 -0.0348 0.0115 
of income distribution (0.0383) (0.0662) (0.0608) (0.0669) (0.0526) (0.0257) 
In sixth decile  0.0494 -0.0127 -0.0177 0.0820 -0.0565 0.00234 
of income distribution (0.0415) (0.0990) (0.0586) (0.0661) (0.0578) (0.0284) 
In seventh decile  -0.0101 0.0713 0.0174 -0.0695 -0.0722 -0.00147 
of income distribution (0.0375) (0.0619) (0.0752) (0.0611) (0.0534) (0.0247) 
In eighth decile -0.0128 -0.0643 0.0113 -0.155 0.0420 0.0398 
of income distribution (0.0419) (0.0704) (0.0613) (0.0977) (0.0567) (0.0261) 
In ninth decile  0.0277 -0.0390 0.110* -0.0284 0.00387 0.0107 
of income distribution (0.0429) (0.0872) (0.0646) (0.0727) (0.0617) (0.0323) 
In tenth decile  0.0727* 0.0177 0.103* 0.0356 0.105** -0.00564 
of income distribution (0.0407) (0.0763) (0.0577) (0.0672) (0.0488) (0.0303) 
Constant 1.487*** 0.809*** 1.361*** 1.641*** 1.267*** 0.945*** 
  (0.113) (0.226) (0.180) (0.170) (0.160) (0.0795) 
Observations 1,872 560 716 596 1,001 1,872 
Results from Cameron and 
Trivedi's -0.2665 -0.2152 -0.2825 -0.2062 -0.2614 -0.2948 
(2005) test: coefficients and t-
values -35.57 -28.03 -23.00 -27.85 -34.52 -76.93 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of children born to a woman. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance 
levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The first column reports results for the 
entire sample, the next three columns report results for separate analyses for the 
three different countries. The last two rows provide additional regression results for 
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two other analyses. The first one (reported in the fourth row) limits the analysis to 
women who are over 45 years old and therefore should have completed their 
fertility decisions. The second one (reported in the fifth row) is for the determinants 
of the ideal number of children of the respondent.  
The reference person is religiously unaffiliated, lives in Japan, lives in a medium-
sized city, and has a household income in the lowest decile of the income 
distribution of the respective country of residence. 
The regression results for the entire sample (reported in the first column) suggest 
that there are effects of religious affiliation on fertility in the sample analysed here. 
Being Catholic is associated with a significant increase in the number of children 
born to a woman, while being a follower of other Christian religions (a category 
only used in Japan) is associated with a significant decrease. There are no 
statistically significant effects for any of the other religions, neither are there any 
effects of traditional attitudes. In the separate regressions for the three countries, 
the positive effect of being Catholic on fertility disappears, which might be 
explained by lack of statistical power in smaller samples.  
In the third section of this article, I derived hypotheses about the expected 
effects of different religions on fertility. The estimation results are in line with the 
hypotheses derived for Catholics, where I expected a moderate positive effect on 
fertility, and for Protestants, Buddhists and traditional attitudes, where I expected 
no effects on fertility, but not in line with the predictions about the effects of Other 
Eastern Religions, where I expected a positive effect on fertility. A very surprising 
result is the finding that being a follower of “other Christian religions”, a category 
only used in Japan, significantly decreases fertility. Selection effects might explain 
this finding, but without more detailed information about the religions included in 
this category, it is impossible to analyze its reasons in more detail. 
These empirical results contrast with previous research results from the US 
that find no difference in fertility patterns between Catholics and (mainstream) 
Protestants anymore (Lehrer 2008). Compared to the scarce previous literature on 
the effects of non-Christian religions, the results here contradict those of de la 
Croix and Delavallade (2014) who find that religious affiliation increases fertility. 
For Protestants, they are similar to the findings Kojima (2014) reports for 
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Protestants, but contradict his results for Catholics. They confirm the earlier 
findings of Skirbekk et al. (2015), who find either no effect or a decreasing effect of 
Buddhism on fertility. McQuillan’s (2004) research might provide an explanation for 
these widely differing results: while it is possible to analyse religion’s prescriptions 
with respect to fertility and check for the existence of pro-natalist norms, the first 
condition that he states for religion to matter for fertility outcomes, it is more 
difficult to empirically assess his second and third condition, namely, that the 
religion needs institutions to enforce and communicate its prescriptions, and that 
religion has to matter greatly in the lives of believers. Different levels of institutional 
development among the different religions and different levels of religiosity among 
the believers in previous research and this article might provide an explanation for 
those results. However, those possible reasons cannot be tested with the EASS 
because of the lack of necessary information in the data set. Finally, it might also 
possible that individuals choose a religion after they have completed their fertility 
decisions. As the EASS does not contain information on religious upbringing or on 
the time when a respondent joined a religion, it should be kept in mind that the 
associations reported here might not necessarily represent a causal effect of 
religion on fertility. At the same time, it is difficult to think about instrumental 
variables or (quasi-) natural experiments to overcome this issue in the context of 
religion. 
For the control variables, there are several results that are in line with 
previous research. More educated women tend to have fewer children, and age at 
marriage reduces the number of children as well. Those living in big cities have 
fewer children, compared to those living in medium-sized cities, but there are no 
differences to those living in the countryside. Compared to respondents in Japan, 
both Koreans and Taiwanese have more children. Interestingly enough, few of the 
income-related variables are statistically significant, with only those in the second 
and in the tenth income decile having more children. Results are almost identical 
for the restricted sample of women above age 45 (reported in column 5). As the 
only difference here, those affiliated with other religions also have fewer children.  
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In Appendix 3, I also present results for the same regressions including 
information on children’s gender. Those results suggest that having a girl as the 
first child is associated with higher fertility, and this result seems to be driven by 
the respondents in Taiwan, with no such effect in Japan and Korea.  
The regression results for separate regressions from the three countries in 
the sample reveal some interesting differences between them. Being very 
traditional is associated with having more children in Korea, but not in the other 
two countries. In Japan, being affiliated with other Christian religions is associated 
with lower fertility and being affiliated with other Eastern religions is associated 
with higher fertility. In Taiwan, there are no effects for religious affiliation or 
traditional attitudes on fertility.  
The result that more educated women have fewer children seems to be 
driven by the respondents from Taiwan, while there is no such relationship in 
Japan and Korea. Those living in a big city only have fewer children in Japan and 
Korea, but not in Taiwan.  
Finally, results on the determinants of the ideal number of children for a 
family were included to analyse possible differences between intended and actual 
fertility outcomes. Again, being Catholic is associated with a higher ideal number 
of children, while being a follower of other Christian religions is associated with a 
lower ideal number of children. With respect to income, those in the second and 
fourth decile of the respective income distribution have significantly lower values 
for the ideal number of children. Finally, Taiwanese women have significantly 
lower values than Japanese women, with no difference for Korean women.  
6.  Conclusion and Outlook 
In this paper, I analysed if there are differences in fertility between followers 
of different religions in East Asian countries, namely, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. In 
line with the theoretical predictions for the effects of different religions derived 
using an identity-economic model and different religions’ fertility-related predictions, 
there seem to be positive effects of being Catholic and no effects for being 
20 
 
Buddhist or being Protestant. There are no effects for being a follower of Other 
Eastern religions, where the model actually predicted positive effects. Finally, 
there are negative effects of being a follower of other Christian religions, but 
because of the lack of information about denominations summarized in this 
category, there were no predictions about its effects. These results should be seen 
against the background of ultra-low fertility rates in the East Asian countries. They 
suggest an interesting difference to results for the US and Europe, where fertility 
differences between Catholics and Protestants have largely disappeared in the 
past decades, and add to the scarce existing empirical evidence on possible 
effects of other religions, especially Buddhism, on fertility outcomes. 
There are several limitations to the present study that should be kept in 
mind. First of all, the spouse’s religious affiliation might affect fertility outcomes, 
especially if it is a heterogamous marriage between followers of different religions 
(Lehrer 1996). However, the lack of information on the spouse’s affiliation in the 
EASS makes it impossible to control for this possibility. Secondly, the questions 
about religious affiliation in the EASS are very broad, including possibly many 
different schools of thought and denominations for some religions, especially for 
Buddhists, Protestants, Other Christian and Other Eastern Religions. This fact 
might bias the results. In order to improve further research on the topic, it would be 
desirable to include more detailed questions on actual denominations or schools of 
thought for Protestants, Buddhists and Other Eastern Religions in questionnaires 
of the EASS, and to allow for the possibility that respondents follow more than one 
religion at the same time. Thirdly, the EASS does not contain information on 
religious upbringing, but just on current religious affiliation. As religion can be seen 
as a choice and there might be the possibility that, for example, individuals self-
select themselves into certain religions, also based on possible identity gains from 
doing so, the effects reported here might not reflect a causal relationship between 
religion and the number of children. However, it is difficult to think about 
instrumental variables or (quasi-) natural experiments to overcome this problem. 
Finally, questions about religiosity of respondents would allow to control for the 
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importance of religion in their daily lives, a characteristic that might affect the 
effects of religion on their fertility behaviour. 
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Appendix A 
Questions used for constructing the Traditional Values Index 
 If you were to have only one child, would you prefer a boy or a girl? (boy: 
traditional) 
 Who do you think is most responsible for taking care of old parents? 
(eldest son: traditional) 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? 
 Husband should be older than wife (completely agree: traditional) 
 It is not necessary to have children in marriage (completely disagree: 
traditional) 
 Married men are generally happier than unmarried men (completely agree: 
traditional) 
 Married women are generally happier than unmarried women (completely 
agree: traditional) 
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 It is all right for a couple to live together without intending to get married 
(completely disagree: traditional) 
 People who want to divorce must wait until children are grown up 
(completely agree: traditional) 
 Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can't seem to work out 
their marriage (completely disagree: traditional) 
 It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to pursue 
her own career (completely agree: traditional) 
 A husband's job is to earn money; a wife's job is to look after the home and 
family (completely agree: traditional) 
 Men ought to do a larger share of household work than they do now 
(completely disagree: traditional) 
 During economic recession, it is all right for women to be laid-off prior to 
men (completely agree: traditional) 
 The authority of father in a family should be respected under any 
circumstances (completely agree: traditional) 
 Children must make efforts to do something that would bring honor to their 
parents (completely agree: traditional) 
 The eldest son should inherit a larger share of the property (completely 
agree: traditional) 
 A child who has taken good care of parents should inherit a larger share of 
the property (completely agree: traditional) 
 To continue the family line, one must have at least one son (completely 
agree: traditional) 
 If husband's family and wife's family need help at the same time, a married 
woman should help husband's family first (completely agree: traditional) 
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 One must put familial well-being and interest before one's own (completely 
agree: traditional) 
 
Appendix B: Complete Summary Statistics  
Table 5: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Catholic 2.2305 1.1254 0 12 
Protestant 0.0366 0.1877 0 1 
Buddhist 0.0896 0.2856 0 1 
Other Christian 0.2671 0.4426 0 1 
Other Eastern 0.0042 0.0650 0 1 
Other religion 0.1918 0.3939 0 1 
Very traditional attitudes 0.0048 0.0689 0 1 
Respondent's age 0.3084 0.4620 0 1 
Respondent's age at marriage 48.4266 13.0850 21 86 
Respondent's years of schooling 11.4213 3.7783 0 23 
Spouse's years of schooling 12.4891 3.5473 0 23 
Respondent's number of siblings 4.4600 2.0707 1 14 
Spouse's first marriage 0.9682 0.1755 0 1 
Lives in big city 0.3280 0.4696 0 1 
Lives in countryside 0.0647 0.2460 0 1 
Lives in Korea 0.2973 0.4572 0 1 
Lives in Taiwan 0.3190 0.4662 0 1 
In second decile of income 
distribution 0.0588 0.2354 0 1 
In third decile of income distribution 0.1134 0.3172 0 1 
In fourth decile of income distribution 0.1017 0.3024 0 1 
In fifth decile of income distribution 0.0959 0.2946 0 1 
In sixth decile of income distribution 0.0668 0.2497 0 1 
In seventh decile of income 
distribution 0.1012 0.3017 0 1 
In eighth decile of income distribution 0.0710 0.2569 0 1 
In ninth decile of income distribution 0.0604 0.2383 0 1 
In tenth decile of income distribution 0.0779 0.2681 0 1 
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Appendix C: Estimation results including information on children’s sex 
Table 6: Additional estimation results 
  
Entire 
Sample Korea Japan Taiwan 
Catholic 0.130*** 0.0860* -0.0554 0.0194 
(0.0501) (0.0467) (0.305) (0.152) 
Protestant 0.00467 0.00445 -0.163 0.0364 
(0.0394) (0.0396) (0.475) (0.0816) 
Buddhist 0.00556 0.0462 0.000944 -0.00348 
(0.0237) (0.0370) (0.0336) (0.0460) 
Other Christian -0.573*** - -0.468*** - 
(0.183) (0.172) 
Other Eastern 0.0221 - 0.144*** -0.0179 
(0.0284) (0.0556) (0.0411) 
Other religion -0.208 -0.157 - -0.204 
(0.147) (0.143) (0.207) 
Very traditional attitudes 0.0225 0.0301 -0.0543 0.00426 
  (0.0220) (0.0305) (0.0497) (0.0287) 
First born child is girl 0.0597** 0.0370 0.00205 0.150*** 
(0.0240) (0.0374) (0.0392) (0.0373) 
First and second born children 0.0530 0.131** 0.0878 -0.0430 
are girls (0.0396) (0.0517) (0.0668) (0.0693) 
First to third born children 0.261*** 0.322*** 0.270 0.200* 
are girls (0.0727) (0.103) (0.170) (0.106) 
First to fourth born children 0.495* - - 0.587** 
are girls (0.274)     (0.258) 
Respondent's age 0.00996*** 0.0206*** 0.00496*** 0.0143*** 
(0.000951) (0.00188) (0.00139) (0.00158) 
Respondent's age at marriage -0.0369*** -0.0356*** -0.0248*** -0.0454*** 
(0.00281) (0.00497) (0.00451) (0.00432) 
Respondent's years of 
schooling -0.0230*** -0.00220 0.00194 -0.0113** 
(0.00401) (0.00733) (0.0109) (0.00512) 
Spouse's years of schooling -0.00273 0.00354 -0.0123* -0.00919* 
(0.00352) (0.00586) (0.00719) (0.00495) 
Respondent's number of 
siblings 0.0109** 0.0101 -0.00688 0.0209*** 
(0.00476) (0.00858) (0.00917) (0.00646) 
Spouse's first marriage -0.0538 -0.0885 -0.101 -0.212*** 
(0.0496) (0.105) (0.0649) (0.0654) 
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Lives in big city -0.0635*** -0.0707** -0.0867** -0.0451 
(0.0208) (0.0290) (0.0376) (0.0311) 
Lives in countryside 0.00122 0.0784 -0.0141 0.112* 
(0.0374) (0.159) (0.0469) (0.0573) 
Lives in Korea 0.0414 - - - 
(0.0316) 
Lives in Taiwan 0.0764** - - - 
(0.0314) 
In second decile  0.158*** 0.204*** - 0.0355 
of income distribution (0.0355) (0.0513) (0.0501) 
In third decile -0.00703 -0.0233 -0.0717 0.0248 
of income distribution (0.0329) (0.0583) (0.0523) (0.0572) 
In fourth decile  0.0191 -0.104 0.00736 -0.0390 
of income distribution (0.0313) (0.0640) (0.0501) (0.0579) 
In fifth decile  -0.000129 -0.0140 0.0462 -0.0654 
of income distribution (0.0382) (0.0634) (0.0609) (0.0641) 
In sixth decile  0.0417 -0.0441 -0.0125 0.0333 
of income distribution (0.0415) (0.0973) (0.0585) (0.0629) 
In seventh decile  -0.0285 0.00173 0.0227 -0.0789 
of income distribution (0.0381) (0.0594) (0.0751) (0.0565) 
In eighth decile -0.00849 -0.0543 0.0149 -0.187** 
of income distribution (0.0415) (0.0660) (0.0612) (0.0941) 
In ninth decile  0.0369 -0.0250 0.118* -0.0529 
of income distribution (0.0414) (0.0824) (0.0646) (0.0660) 
In tenth decile  0.0689* 0.00278 0.0950* 0.0141 
of income distribution (0.0405) (0.0737) (0.0573) (0.0626) 
Constant 1.403*** 0.667*** 1.308*** 1.567*** 
  (0.114) (0.210) (0.183) (0.155) 
Observations 1,872 560 716 596 
 
